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Chapter 6
Using Ontologies and Machine Learning
for Hazard Identification and Safety Analysis
O. Daramola, T. Sta˚lhane, I. Omoronyia, and G. Sindre
Abstract Safety analysis (SA) procedures, such as hazard and operability analysis
(HazOp) and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), are generally regarded as
repetitious, time consuming, costly and require a lot of human involvement. Previous
efforts have targeted automated support for SA at the design stage of system
development. However, studies have shown that the cost of correcting a safety
error is much higher when done at the later stages than the early stages of system
development. Hence, relative to previous approaches, this chapter presents an
approach for hazard identification (HazId) based on requirements and reuse-oriented
safety analysis. The approach offers a convenient starting point for the identification
of potential system safety concerns from the RE phase of development. It ensures that
knowledge contained in both the requirements document and previously documented
HazOp projects can be leveraged in order to attain a reduction in the cost of SA by
using established technologies such as ontology, case-based reasoning (CBR), and
natural language processing (NLP). The approach is supported by a prototype tool,
which was assessed by conducting a preliminary evaluation. The results indicate that
the approach enables reuse of experience in conducting safety analysis, provides a
sound basis for early identification of system hazards when used with a good domain
ontology and is potentially suitable for application in practice by experts.
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6.1 Introduction
Safety analysis (SA) embraces all of the hazard identification (HazId), risk and safety
assessment activities involved in the development of safety-critical embedded
systems. The goal of SA is to influence safety-critical system design by conducting
several types of safety procedures in order to identify potential system hazards and
risks and to mitigate them to acceptable levels before a system is certified. Safety
analysis procedures, such as hazard and operability analysis (HazOp) and failure
mode and effect analysis (FMEA), are generally regarded as repetitious, time
consuming, costly and require a lot of human involvement [1–3]. Although
human expertise is irreplaceable in the conduct of effective SA procedures at the
moment, there is a need to reduce the amount of human effort and cost of SA.
Previous efforts to address this problem have been based largely on expert system
approaches, which target automated support for SA from the design stage of system
development [1, 4]. However, studies [5, 6] have shown that the cost of correcting a
safety error is much higher when done at the later stages than the early stages of
system development. Since requirements engineering (RE) precedes system design,
it provides a convenient starting point for the identification of potential safety
concerns of a system if the knowledge contained in requirement documents can
be extracted and used as the initial basis for SA. Hence, tool support for SA at the
RE phase will be more beneficial for attaining a reduction in the cost of hazard
identification and hazard mitigation.
HazOp is one of the prominent safety analysis techniques [4]. HazOp is used to
study hazards and operability problems by investigating the effects of deviations from
prescribed design intent in order to mitigate the occurrence of adverse consequences.
It involves early discovery of potential system hazards and operation problems and
recommendation of appropriate safeguard mechanisms by a team of experts.
However, HazOp is a time consuming, costly and a largely human-centred
process [1, 3, 6]. The HazOp process is essentially subjective, relying on the
professional experience, expertise and creativity of the team members involved.
Some of the crucial challenges of HazOp which are still open research issues are:
(1) how to reduce the level of subjectivity, (2) how to reduce the amount of human
effort, (3) how to promote reuse of valuable knowledge gained in previous HazOp
studies and (4) how to facilitate transfer of HazOp experiences among HazOp teams
[3, 7]. These challenges motivate the need for a framework that could enable early
identification of hazards and reuse-oriented HazOp analysis. The first objective of
this work is to provide a decision support tool that could assist the human expert
in the process of identifying potential safety concerns that are contained in
the requirements document. The second is to create a platform for the reuse of
knowledge from previous HazOp studies in subsequent projects, in order to reduce
the amount of human effort needed while conducting HazOp. This work would
be useful in the safety analysis of product line systems or variant systems, where
the systems share a significant degree of commonality. Also, the approach could
be valuable in the context of system development models that are iterative or
incremental in nature where there is a need to continually revise requirements
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and design specifications during the period of development. Our focus on HazOp
stems from the interests of the CESAR project1 that we are currently involved in.
We have adopted an approach that combines three technologies to realise the
stated objectives of this work, namely:
• Case-based reasoning (CBR), which is a pattern-based problem solving para-
digm that enables the reuse of previously gained knowledge in resolving a new
case [8]
• Ontology, which is the semantic representation of the shared formal conceptual-
ization of a domain that provides a platform for the standardisation of terms and
vocabulary in the domain [9]
• Natural language processing (NLP) which is the processing and analysis of
natural language text [10]
A prototype tool called KROSA (knowledge reuse-oriented safety analysis) that
demonstrates the novel integration of these three technologies has been created to
validate our approach. The unique contribution of this work is the integration of
ontology and machine learning technologies into a framework that enables the
identification of hazards from requirements and reduction of effort needed for
HazOp through knowledge reuse. In this chapter, we present a description of the
proposed framework and the evaluation of the prototype tool by an experiment and
opinions provided by domain experts at ABB Norway.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Sect. 6.2 presents the background
for the context of this chapter, while Sect. 6.3 describes a HazOp problem example
and how tool support can be provided for HazId based on requirements. In Sect. 6.4,
we give a description of the KROSA framework and how it can be used for HazOp.
Section 6.5 presents the evaluation procedure used for assessing the KROSA tool,
while Sect. 6.6 discusses the results of the evaluation and the threats to validity of
results. In Sect. 6.7, we review some closely related work, and the chapter is
concluded in Sect. 6.8 with a brief note and indication of our future research plans.
6.2 Background
In this section, we give a brief overview of the general HazOp process and the key
technologies that are relevant to this work.
6.2.1 Overview of the HazOp Process
A hazard and operability study (HazOp) is a structured and semiformalised team-
based procedure that focuses on the study of a system under design, in order to
identify and evaluate potential hazards that may constitute a risk to personnel or
1 http://www.cesarproject.eu
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equipment or prevent efficient operation of the system. A HazOp study is
undertaken by a HazOp team through a series of brainstorming sessions in order
to stimulate creativity used to reveal potential hazards in the system and their
cause–effect relationships [1, 4]. HazOp is based on the assumption that a problem
can only arise when a system deviates from its design and operational intents.
Hence, the HazOp study entails a detailed walkthrough of the process and
instrumentation diagram models of a system to spot every likely deviation from
its intended operation using a set of guidewords. Generally, guidewords represent
variations of known system parameters that may cause deviation from design
intentions. They are chosen and interpreted based on particular design representa-
tion and context. Examples include no, not, more, less, before, after, late, too often
and early. Examples of parameter–guidewords pairs include arrive late, arrive
early, no flow, not sent and sent after. Guidewords are carefully selected to
stimulate reasoning about all potential system hazards. A point of observation
pertaining to a system or process that can be a source of a potential hazard is called
a study node. As each deviation is derived, the HazOp team discusses potential
causes, consequences and safeguards and recommend appropriate control actions to
forestall or mitigate its occurrence.
Typically, it takes about 1–8 weeks for a HazOp team with 4–8 members to
conduct a HazOp, depending on the size and complexity of the system in question.
It is widely accepted that HazOp analysis is an extremely time-consuming process
[1, 3, 4]. More on the procedure of HazOp study and ideals of HazOp team,
membership composition can be found in [11].
6.2.2 Case-Based Reasoning (CBR)
CBR is an instance-based machine learning paradigm that emulates the human
reasoning process of solving problems based on past experiences. In CBR, problems
are modelled as abstraction called cases which consist of the problem part and the
solution part. The CBR life cycle [8] is a four-stage process that consists of (1) case
retrieval – where old cases that are similar to a new case are identified by comparing
the problem parts of the old cases and that of the new case using a similarity metric;
(2) case reuse – which entails applying the solution part of the most relevant old case
or group of old cases to the new case, and this may also involve adaptation of the old
solutions to fit the new case; (3) case revision – where the reused solution is tested for
appropriateness in the new case, and if need be, the reused solution is revised to fit the
new case; and (4) case retention – which entails storing a solved case in the case base
(repository) for future reuse. CBR provides a mechanism of organising, storing and
reusing an organisation’s memory or experiences. As such, it offers a credible model
of experience-based problem solving once relevant cases exist [12]. The CBR
paradigm is considered particularly relevant to the context of HazOp because of its
potential to support the acquisition, retrieval, reuse and retention of knowledge,
which provides a basis for documented experiences from previous HazOp studies
to be leveraged in subsequent HazOp projects.
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6.2.3 Ontology
Ontology which is a shared formal conceptualization of a domain is a key technology
to shaping and exploiting information for the effective management of knowledge
that pertains to specific domains [13]. Ontologies have human and machine-readable
semantics that allow definition of semantic relationships between entities and
inference of knowledge through reasoning at runtime. According to [14], ontologies
have the capability to (1) enable knowledge reuse, (2) ensure better understanding
of a knowledge area, (3) support analysis of the structure of knowledge, (4) foster
understanding of available knowledge in a domain and (5) provide embedded
knowledge for an application that can be used by machines. Ontology is considered
relevant to the HazOp problem because of its potential to facilitate (1) formalised
semantic description of relevant domain knowledge for identification of system
hazards, (2) interoperable transmission of knowledge among HazOp teams and
(3) knowledge reuse while conducting HazOp.
6.2.4 Natural Language Processing (NLP)
NLP is concerned with the process of extracting meaningful information from natural
language text through the use of statistical machine learning algorithms [10]. In NLP,
machine learning algorithms automatically learn rules through the analysis of large
corpora of real-world examples. A corpus (plural, “corpora”) is a set of documents
that have been manually annotated with the correct values to be learned. The learned
rules are then used to classify words into various word categories (part of speech)
following the supervised learning model. Key NLP operations include sentence
tokenisation, part-of-speech tagging, coreference resolution, anaphora resolution,
named-entity recognition and morphology analysis. NLP is a necessity for automated
requirements analysis because requirements are mostly written as natural language
text. Therefore, our approach uses NLP in combination with ontology to enable the
extraction of useful knowledge from natural language requirement documents for the
early identification of potential system hazards.
6.2.5 Knowledge Management in Requirements Engineering
In recent times, the application of knowledge management technologies such as
ontologies, NLP and CBR has gained momentum in requirements engineering. In
[15], the SoftWiki approach was reported as a way of semantifying requirements
engineering. According to the authors, semantification of RE entails representing each
requirement as a unique instance of the Semantic Web having its own URI such that
spatially distributed stakeholders – including developers and users – can collect,
semantically enrich, classify and aggregate requirements within the context of
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collaborative software development. The approach uses the SoftWiki Ontology for
Requirements Engineering (SWORE) to facilitate the semantification process. Simi-
larly, [14] gave an elaborate overview of how ontologies can be applied in collabora-
tive software development and the vision of a software engineering Semantic Web.
In [16], a framework for requirements elicitation using ontology reasoning
was proposed. NLP was used to parse initial requirements to obtain key concepts
that can be mapped to functions in the domain ontology. Thereafter, the rules
and relations among functions in the ontology were used to reason about errors
and potential requirements. Other research efforts where ontologies have been
applied for requirements elicitation and analysis include [17] where a domain
ontology and requirements meta-model were used to elicit and define textual
requirements; in [18], an approach for goal-oriented and ontology-driven
requirements elicitation (GOORE) was proposed. In GOORE, the knowledge of a
specific domain is represented as an ontology, which is then used for goal-oriented
requirements analysis.
In [19], a perspective for the application of CBR for requirements engineering was
provided. Also, [12] gave a detailed account of the probable applications of CBR in
software engineering in the aspects of prediction and reuse. In [20], CBR was used to
evaluate the requirements quality by referring to previously stored software
requirements quality analysis cases (past experiences) in order to ensure that the
quality of the prepared SRS is acceptable, while [21] proposed a framework for
managing implicit requirements by using a combination of ontology and CBR. All
of these efforts indicate an increasing interest in the application of ontology, NLP and
CBR as knowledge management technologies in requirements engineering.
6.3 Simplified Steam Boiler Example
The steam boiler system is a simplified version of an industrial steam boiler,
developed as a first pilot system for testing CESAR concepts. In order to have a
simple system, important components such as the feeding tank and the blow down
valve are left out.
The functional requirements of the steam boiler are as follows:
1. The steam boiler shall deliver steam at a predefined, constant pressure to an
industrial process.
2. Steam is produced by heating water using an electric heating element.
3. The steam pressure is controlled by regulating the temperature setting on the
heating element thermostat.
4. The water level in the tank is controlled by a feeding pump which pumps water
into the tank via a non-return valve.
5. The safety of the steam boiler is taken care of by a safety valve that opens to air.
The release pressure for the safety valve is fixed, based on the boiler’s strength.
6. The system shall be safety integrity level two (SIL2) certifiable.
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In the CESAR project, we have embraced the notion of requirements
boilerplates2 which stems from the work in [22, 23] for writing requirements in
semiformalised form. A boilerplate is a textual template for requirements specifi-
cation that is based on predefined patterns, which reduces the level of inconsistency
in the way requirements are expressed. We have also introduced additional require-
ment boilerplates patterns that are considered well suited for embedded systems
requirements.
For the steam boiler example, we will now use the following predefined sample
boilerplates2:
BP1: The < system > shall < action>
BP2: The < system > shall be able to < action > using < system>
BP3: If < condition>, the < system > shall < action>
The functional requirements of the steam boiler can then be transformed to a
semiformal form as follows:
R1: The < steam boiler > shall be able to < deliver > [<steam > to < an
industrial process>] – BP1
R2: The < steam boiler > shall be able to < produce > [<steam > using
(<electrical > <heating element>)] – BP2
R3: The < steam boiler > shall be able to < control > [<steam pressure >
using (<thermostat > of < electrical > <heating element>)] – BP2
R4: The < steam boiler > shall be able to < control > [<water level > using
(<feeding pump>)] – BP2
R5: The < feeding pump > shall be able to < deliver > [<water > using
(<non-return valve>)] – BP2
R6: If [<steam pressure > greater than < critical pressure level>], the < steam
boiler > shall [<open > <safety valve>] – BP3
6.3.1 Preliminary HazOp (PHA) for Steam Boiler
Usually, based on a concept diagram for system – say a steam boiler – a team of
experts would run a PHA by brainstorming on specific requirements and
components of the system in order to identify potential hazards that may arise
from possible deviations from the design intent of the steam boiler. The result of
such a PHA for a steam boiler system would be a manually generated preliminary
HazOp table. A small part of such a table is shown in Table 6.1.
2www.requirementsengineering.info/boilerplates.htm
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6.3.2 Tool Support for HazId Based on Requirements
Our objective in this work is to provide tool-based support for HazId based on
requirements – which is usually a costly manual procedure – such that:
1. Requirement documents can be analysed semantically using a combination of
shallow NLP and domain knowledge as contained in the domain ontology, to
identify potential system hazards automatically. Hence using the steam boiler
ontology (see Fig. 6.2), columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.1 – a HazOp table for the
steam boiler system – can be automatically generated.
2. The user is able to partially or totally reuse relevant parts of previously
documented HazOp projects in order to generate causes, effect, safeguards and
appropriate control actions for each system hazard that has been identified –
generate data for columns 2–5 of specific hazards (study node) in Table 6.1.
With this proposed approach, we aim to provide relevant tool support for the
HazOp experts so as to reduce the amount of effort needed and also to offer a good
starting point for HazOp in instances where there is paucity of experts. We will now
describe the architecture of our approach in the next section.
6.4 The KROSA Framework
The architectural framework of our proposed approach is an integration of the three
core technologies NLP, CBR and ontology. A view of the architecture is presented
in Fig. 6.1. The core system functionalities are depicted as rectangular boxes, while
the logic, data and knowledge artefacts that enable core system functionalities are
depicted using oval boxes. A detailed description of the KROSA framework is
given in the following.
6.4.1 Knowledge Representation and Extraction
In this section, we describe the parts of the KROSA architecture that deals with
knowledge representation and extraction.
(a) Data Preprocessing
The input to the framework is a preprocessed requirements document.
Preprocessing is a manual procedure that ensures that source documents are
transformed into a form that is suitable for the framework. It entails extraction of
requirements in form of sentences from source documents, extracting sentences that
define system requirements and replacing information conveyed in figures, diagrams
and tables with equivalent sentences. Also, the requirements could be expressed in
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semiformalised way using requirement boilerplates. Boilerplate requirements will also
be more susceptible to treatment by NLP algorithms (Fig. 6.1).
(b) HazOp Ontology
The HazOp ontology defines, in a generic form, the concept of a study node,
its elements and the relationships between them. These are types of study node,
description, guidewords, deviations, causes, consequences, risk level, safeguards and
recommendation. The HazOp ontology was developed using OWL DL language
and consists of 17 classes, 23 object properties and 43 restrictions. Figure 6.3 presents
a schematic view of the structure of the HazOp ontology. It has two important
roles: (1) helping to identify potential hazards during study nodes recommendation
since its specification clearly defines which type of domain concept could be a study
node and (2) validation of the structure of the HazOp information before it is stored
in the case library during case retention. A HazOp study node must be one of the
types defined in the HazOp ontology.
(c) Ontology Library
The ontology library is a repository of domain ontologies. The domain
ontologies (.owl/.rdf) could be those that have been developed for the purpose of
a) Document Pre-processing  
e) Study node  
recommendation
d) NL   
Processor
Knowledge 
Retrieval 
Knowledge 
Retention 
Knowledge 
Query 
Adaptation 
Procedure 
Case 
Library  
Processed 
Requirements 
Boilerplate 
Requirements 
f ) CBR  MODULE
b) HazOp ontology
c) Ontology Library
g) Reports 
Generation
Domain ontologies
Fig. 6.1 Architectural framework for reuse-oriented HAZOP
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safety analysis or an existing ontology that is based on domain-specific safety
standards. The domain ontology consists of all the terms in the domain and the
set of relationships between terms in the domain. The domain ontology plays two
Water 
level
Boiler-tank
Feeding-pump
Non-return valve
Tank
Max-critlimit
Pump
On
Off
infers
has
Is 
controlled 
by Min water level
Max.Water level  
Water level indicator
Control-system
infer
has-state
is-coupled 
with
Heating 
element
Pressure indicator
Temprature 
indicator
infer
is-coupled  to 
isa
isa
Owl:Thing
Fig. 6.2 A view of a part of the steam boiler ontology
Owl: Thing
Study node
Component
Event
isa
Activity
System
Interface
Operation
isa
isa
isa
isa
isa
isa
Context description
Consequence
Cause
Recommendation
Deviation
Guide word
has
Risk Level
Safe guard
isa
has
has
has
has
has
has
has
isa
isa
isa
isa
isa
isa
isa
Fig. 6.3 A view of the classes and restrictions in the HAZOP ontology
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roles: (1) identification of valid domain concepts that are contained in requirements
document and (2) ensuring that standardised terms used in describing HazOp
information during knowledge (case) retention agree with the established vocabu-
lary of the domain. As an example, a view of part of the steam boiler ontology
which describes the concepts of the steam boiler system and the interrelationships
between the concepts is shown in Fig. 6.2. The ontology library, the HazOp
ontology and the case library jointly constitute the knowledge model of the
framework.
(d) NL Processor
The NL processor component facilitates the processing of natural language and
boilerplate requirements during the process of automatic recommendation of
HazOp study nodes. The core natural language processing operations implemented
in the architecture are:
• Tokenisation: Splitting of requirements statements (sentences) into word parts.
• Parts of speech tagging: Classification of tokens (words) in requirements
statements into parts of speech such as noun, verb, adjective and pronoun.
• Pronominal anaphora resolution: The process of identifying pronouns
(anaphors) which have noun phrases as antecedents in requirements statements.
This is essential in associating sentences that refer to the same requirement.
• Lexical parsing: Creating the syntax tree that represents the grammatical
structure of requirements statements, in order to determine phrases, subjects,
objects and predicates.
The stanford NLP toolkit3 for natural language processing was used to implement
all NLP operations.
(e) Study Node Recommendation
The procedure for automatic study node recommendation is based on a heuristic
algorithm that is derived from basic knowledge of HazOp. Study node generation is
not intended to replace human capability but rather to create a credible starting
point for early hazard identification and to alleviate the amount human effort
involved. The algorithm searches for potential study nodes in two ways:
• Requirements level (RL): A requirement statement is considered a candidate if
the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the requirement statement contains an
action-entity pair such as “open valve”, “close valve”, “start pump” or “stop
pump” (action and entity may not necessarily follow each other in a sentence);
(2) the actionmust be an instance of a generic HazOp action word (such as: stop,
close, open, send, reset, cut, receive, start or their synonyms) or one of a set of
3 http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/lex-parser.shtml
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user specified keywords, while entity is a valid concept in the domain ontology;
and (3) the entity identified in requirement statement belongs to one of the
predefined study node types (components, system, etc.) as described in the
HazOp ontology.
• Component level(CL): A term (word) contained in a requirement statement is
considered a candidate study node if the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the
term is a valid concept in the domain ontology; (2) there exists at least one axiom
that pertains to the term in the domain ontology which indicates that it could be a
study node (In other words, it is one of several types of study nodes as defined by
the HazOp ontology) and (3) the term has failure modes or guidewords defined on
it (such as stuck, omission, commission) in the domain ontology. At the CL level,
terms that satisfy the criteria (1) and (3), (1), (2) and (3) or (1) and (3) are
considered to be candidates. However, a term is ignored if it is same as, equivalent
to or a subclass of another term that has been selected as a potential study node.
6.4.2 Knowledge Reuse
This section describes the parts of the KROSA architecture that deals with knowl-
edge reuse and also report generation.
(f) CBR Module
The CBR component facilitates the knowledge reuse capability of the frame-
work. It emulates the typical workflow of the CBR life cycle which is retrieve,
reuse, revise and retain [8, 24]. Retrieval by the CBR module is performed by
displaying a ranked list of cases similar to a target case. Two types of reuse are
supported: (1) total reuse – all parts of a case are reused for a new case, and
(2) partial reuse – only parts of an existing case are reused in a target case. Revision
can be effected by the HazOp expert by making modifications to the selected case to
suit the new target case. Retention is done through storage of study node informa-
tion into the case library. The case library is implemented as a MySQL database
management system (DBMS) in order to leverage its inherent capabilities for
effective case organisation, case indexing, case storage and case retrieval.
(g) Report Generation
This module enables the generation of HazOp reports based on query posed by
the user. HazOp reports are queried based on date and the HazOp id.
6.4.3 Case Model and Case Similarity
The case model is an abstraction of the way HazOp information is represented in the
framework. A HazOp case encapsulates information attributes such as name of a
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study node (unique), context description and set of applicable guidewords,
deviations, causes, consequences, risk levels, safeguards and recommendations.
The case model is partitioned into a problem part and a solution part. The three
elements of a HazOp case model that constitute the problem part are contextual
description, study node type and the set of guidewords; the remaining elements of
the case model make up the solution part.
At the instance of a new (target) case, an algorithm is used to compute the
similarity between the problem parts of the new case and all existing relevant cases
in the case library to determine suitable candidates for retrieval. The solution part of
a chosen retrieved case is then used verbatim or revised as the solution part of the
target case. There are several candidate similarity algorithms that can be used for
case retrieval depending on the value of attributes of data elements [25]. The
similarity algorithm used for comparing cases is based on the degree of intersection
between two attributes of a case, which are the set of contextual descriptions and the
set of guidewords, while the type of study node is used to determine relevant cases.
Similarity between an attribute of the new case U and a corresponding attribute of
an existing case V is determined by computing the metric:
SimðU;VÞ ¼
U \ Vj j
Uj j
(6.1)
where
U \ V ¼ fx : x 2 Uandx 2 Vg
Case Similarity: Finally, the similarity between two cases is computed by using
the weighted sum of the individual similarity metrics, where wi denotes the weight
assigned to the ith attribute of a case. This is given as [26]:
Sim final ¼ w1simðcontextÞ þ w2sim2ðguidewordsÞ (6.2)
We have used equal weights (i.e., w1 ¼ w2 ¼ 1) since the parameters are
considered as equally important.
6.5 Performing HazOp with KROSA
The process of using the KROSA tool for HazOp is as follows:
Step 1: Preprocessing of source documents to get the requirements into MS Excel or
text file format and devoid of graphics, images and tables.
Step 2: Select existing domain ontology or create a new one to be used for the
HazOp.
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Step 3: Import requirement documents and domain ontology into the KROSA
environment.
Step 4: Supply the set of keywords that best describe the focus of the HazOp.
Step 5: Obtain recommended study nodes from KROSA.
Step 6: Expert approves a set of study nodes for the HazOp by selecting from or
adding to the recommendations by KROSA.
Step 7: For each approved study node, expert leverages KROSA’s case retrieval,
reuse and retention features to generate information for specific study nodes. By
doing so, the user attempts to save some effort by using content of the reuse
repository to provide information for new study nodes. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 are
snapshots of the interfaces for study node recommendation and case retrieval for
reuse in the KROSA tool, respectively.
Fig. 6.4 A view of recommended study nodes by the KROSA tool
Fig. 6.5 A view of ranked list of similar cased retrieved by the tool
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6.6 Evaluation
We have developed the KROSA4 (knowledge reuse-oriented safety analysis) tool, a
domain-independent CBR platform for ontology-supported HazOp that is based on
the Eclipse plug-in architecture. In following subsections, we discuss how the
KROSA tool can be integrated into the HazOp process and subsequently describe
the procedure used for its evaluation.
6.6.1 Evaluation Procedure
KROSA has been subjected to two kinds of evaluation: first, an in-house simulation
experiment to assess the quality of its recommendation of study nodes, using
requirements specifications obtained from ABB Norway, one of our partners in
the CESAR project. Second, we performed a field assessment where industry
experts from ABB Norway assessed the usability of KROSA for an industrial
HazOp process. The objectives of the field evaluation were threefold: (1) to assess
the consistency of the outcome of the tool as judged by the human experts, (2) to
assess the potential of the tool to enable reuse-oriented HazOp and (3) to determine
its usefulness as a support tool for safety analysis. Also, we wanted to identify areas
of possible improvement of the tool.
6.6.1.1 Simulation Experiment
In the simulation experiment, we worked with three sets of requirements: (1) rail
lock system, (2) steam boiler control system and (3) adaptive cruise control (ACC)
system. Three ontologies used for the experiment are rail lock system ontology,
steam boiler ontology and ACC ontology. Two of the ontologies (steam boiler and
ACC ontology) had existed prior to KROSA, having been used to support previous
ontology-based research project in CESAR [27]. These two ontologies have a fairly
wide circulation among CESAR partners. The rail lock system ontology was
created for this experiment, based on information obtained from the specification
of the GP rail lock system. The three ontologies have the common characteristics
that they were developed to be usable for safety analysis in addition to other uses.
This is because (1) safety relevant terms were used to describe ontological
concepts, e.g., object properties such as isComponent, isConcept, isFailuremode
and isInterface exist in the ontologies; (2) the semantic description of components
included the definition of generic failure modes such as stuck, omission and
commission. The simulation experiment compared recommendations from
KROSA with those obtained from four safety experts (researchers) for the same
4KROSA tool can be downloaded at https://www.idi.ntnu.no/~wande/Krosa-user-guide.htm
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set of requirements. We then computed the recall and precision scores for KROSA
relative to the recommendations made by each of the four safety experts that
participated in the experiment (see Eqs. 6.3 and 6.4):
precision ¼
jfExpert:recommgj \ jfKROSA:recommgj
jfKROSA:recommgj
(6.3)
recall ¼
jfExpert:recommgj \ jfKROSA:recommgj
jfExpert:recommgj
(6.4)
6.6.1.2 Expert Assessment
For the field assessment, the direct method of expert systems evaluation [28, 29]
was used. This method entails making qualified human experts to use a system for
solving a simple benchmark problem; thereafter based on their experience, the
human expert answers a set of questions about the system. The questions are
quantitative and based on a 0 (completely false) to 5 (very true) numerical scales.
A metric called “satisfaction level” that ranges from 0 (least satisfied user) to 5
(most satisfied user) is then computed based on the data obtained from all
participants. The satisfaction level is a measure of the likelihood of the system to
satisfy a prospective user.
The questions, the objective of each question and the weight associated with
each question (which all the participants agreed on) are as follows:
1. Sufficient information is provided for guidance and orientation of evaluators
prior to conducting the experiment (orientation) – (2).
2. The KROSA tool reaches a conclusion similar to that of a human expert
(correctness of result) – (2).
3. Does the KROSA tool provide reasonable justification for its conclusion?
(correctness of result) – (2).
4. The KROSA tool is accurate in its suggestions of study nodes (accuracy of
result) – (2).
5. The result is complete. The user does not need to do additional work to get a
usable result (accuracy of result) – (2).
6. Does the result of the system change if changes are made to the system
parameters? (sensitivity) – (1).
7. The overall usability of the KROSA tool is satisfactory (confidence) – (1).
8. The KROSA tool gives useful conclusions (confidence) – (2).
9. The KROSA tool adequately supports reuse of knowledge for HazOp (support
for reuse) – (2).
10. The KROSA tool improves as data, or experience is inserted (support for
reuse) – (1).
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11. The limitations of the KROSA tool can be detected at this point in time
(limitation) – (1).
12. There are still many limitations to make the KROSA tool usable (limitation) – (1).
An evaluator gives a score between 0 and 5 per question. From the scores, a
weighted score for the satisfaction level per evaluator can be calculated using the
metric below:
Re sult ¼
Xn
k¼1
weight)scorevalueð Þ=
Xn
k¼1
weight (6.5)
where n is the number of questions.
A one-day orientation workshop on how to use the tool was conducted for all
participants, after which they had one full week to interact with the tool. The expert
participants also had a detailed user manual as further guide for using the tool.
6.7 Evaluation Results
In this section, we give an overview of results from the two evaluations carried out.
6.7.1 Simulation
Table 6.2 shows the recall and precision scores computed for KROSA relative to
the four safety experts’ (E1–E4) recommendations. Although the experts differed in
their recommendations, confirming the subjective nature of HazOp, there exist
significant agreements between study nodes recommended by KROSA and experts
at the requirements level. At the component level (CL), there was a greater degree
of agreement because the opinions of the safety experts generally agree that all
components and interfaces between components and systems should be study nodes
as recommended by KROSA. Since the experts were generally not very specific in
their recommendations at the CL, recommendations at CL were not considered
when arriving at the values in Table 6.2. The result – precision5 and recall6 values –
shown in Table 6.2 is an improved version of the one reported in [27] since we have
had more time to improve on the quality of the domain ontologies.
Our observation from the simulation experiment (see Figs. 6.6 and 6.7) is that
the performance of the KROSA tool depends significantly on the quality of the
5 Precision – percentage of suggested hazards that are relevant compared to expert’s
recommendation.
6Recall – percentage of relevant hazards suggested by tool compared to expert’s recommendation.
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Table 6.2 Showing recall and precision values of KROSA
Recall E1 E2 E3 E4
Steam boiler system (HazOp on water level) 0.57 0.67 0.75 0.60
ACC system (HazOp on speed control) 0.50 0.67 0.71 0.60
Rail lock system (HazOp on communication) 0.54 0.78 0.71 0.60
Precision E1 E2 E3 E4
Steam boiler system (HazOp on water level) 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.50
ACC system (HazOp on speed control) 0.80 0.80 1.0 0.6
Rail lock system (HazOp on communication) 0.78 0.78 0.56 0.33
Fig. 6.6 Recall metric for
KROSA
Fig. 6.7 Precision metric for
KROSA
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domain ontology, even though the input of highly relevant keywords can enhance
the appropriateness of the recommended study nodes. Specific ontology qualities
are considered most crucial here, which are [30] (1) syntactic quality – the measure
of the correctness of terms in the ontology and the richness of syntax used to
describe terms in the ontology, (2) semantic quality – the measure how well the
meaning of terms is defined in the ontology and (3) pragmatic quality – the measure
of the how well it covers the scope of a domain judged by the number of classes and
properties it contains and how accurate and relevant the information is that it
provides. A domain ontology that contains a large number of concepts that are
credible and are richly described with axioms will be more suitable for KROSA in
the task of study node recommendation. Initially, we noticed that the KROSA tool
had a relatively lower precision for HazOp of the steam boiler system compared to
its performance in the HazOp for the ACC and rail lock systems. The reason for this
was that the steam boiler ontology has a lower semantic quality than the ACC
ontology and rail lock system ontology. After we improved on the quality of
description of concepts and interrelationships between concepts of the steam boiler
ontology, we obtained better results. This is not difficult to comprehend since the
domain ontology provides the knowledge base from which inferences are made by
the KROSA tool when determining what could be a potential system hazard (study
node). Thus, we conclude that the overall quality of the domain ontology affects the
performance of KROSA tool significantly, as it determines the extent to which
inferences can be made for identification of study nodes.
6.7.2 Expert Evaluation
Each of the three industry experts that took part in the assessment returned an
evaluation report from which we computed a mean weighted score of 3.27 out of 5
for the KROSA tool in relation to the evaluation objectives of the field assessment.
The tool obtained its highest mean score ratings in the aspects of support for reuse
(4.08), sensitivity (3.67), confidence (3.25) and accuracy of result (3.25), while the
lowest mean score ratings were in the aspects of: limitations (3.0) and correctness
of result (2.7). These mean score ratings reveal the perception of the experts in
terms of the strengths and weaknesses of the current version of the tool. The experts
also submitted a detailed report on desired improvements needed to make the tool
more usable. Key aspects mentioned as needing improvement were (1) the possi-
bility of providing some form of guidance to users in the selection of the most
appropriate keywords for study node recommendation and (2) the need to provide
some form of traceability links between cases that have inherited some parts from
old cases through reuse. The experts were unanimous in confirming that the tool
will be a valuable support for the conduct of HazOp, with the potential to alleviate
the complexity of the HazOp process by enabling reuse of experience.
The experts agreed that the existence of a domain ontology and a case library
where previous knowledge is stored in a structured format would help to resolve
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some of the existing difficulties associated with searching, update and interopera-
bility of knowledge during HazOp. They expressed preference for the adoption of
KROSA as a support tool for HazOp over the current scenario where MS Excel
software is the main tool support for their safety analysis.
6.7.3 Threats to Validity
Our short discussion on the validity of the preliminary evaluation will be based on
the categories defined by Wohlin et al. in [31]. We consider each threat before
giving a summary of validity of our results.
Conclusion Validity: In order to ensure reliable treatment, all participants were
provided with an introduction and instructions for the experiment prior to the
experiment. Also, we used standard measures – recall and precision to assess
recommendations by the tool in order to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpreta-
tion of the results. Ordinarily using four participants in the experiment will translate
to low statistical power, but for highly technical domain like HazOp and a prelimi-
nary evaluation, we consider this to be sufficient for a first trial.
Internal Validity: A key requirement is that participants have sufficient experi-
ence or knowledge of the domain. The participants had minimum master-level
education in the area of systems safety. They were also provided with detailed
instructions of what should be done. Therefore, there were no factors other than the
treatment that influenced the outcome of the experiment.
Construct Validity: In order to ensure a realistic experiment, all participants had
the same instruction for the experiment. Also, they performed exactly the same task
which is to identify hazards (study nodes). Hence, the results obtained from
participants depend only on this task (one single variable), which eliminates any
mono-method bias effect.
External Validity: The key issue here is whether we can generalise our results
from the preliminary evaluation to the system safety industry. For the simulation
experiment, we used four expert researchers all affiliated with NTNU, while the
industrial assessment was done by three safety experts at ABB Norway. A concern
could be that possibly there would have been different results if the evaluations had
been performed with a bigger group of participants with more diverse background,
not only in terms of coming from different institutions and countries but also with
more different educational backgrounds and covering a wider spectrum of safety-
critical domains than could be achieved with only seven persons. The involved
persons mainly had experience in safety analysis in the following domains: railway,
automotive and industrial automation, and it is impossible to know if the tool would
have been found equally promising by experts from other domains, such as nuclear
power, medical technology and aviation. Our mitigation to this threat is to try to
avoid including any domain-specific limitations in our general approach, but this
does not entirely remove the threat. So, while we currently see no reason why the
approach should not also be usable in other companies and other safety-critical
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domains, an interesting point for further research is to have a wider group of experts
to try out the tool.
Hence, we cannot foresee any serious threats to validity for our conclusions on
the simulation experiment performed. Also, the feedback for industry experts
proved that the KROSA tool has sufficient merit for application in an industrial
setting.
6.8 Related Work
Previously a number of attempts to solve some of the problems of HazOp analysis
have been reported in the literature [1, 3, 7]. A significant number of HazOp expert
systems and HazOp system prototypes have been reported in [4]. These include
HazOpEX, Batch HazOpExpert, HazOp Diagraph Model (HDG), STOPHAZ,
OptHazOp, EXPERTOP, HazOpTool and COMHazOp. A common trend for all
of these attempts is that their implementation and application were focussed on the
chemical process industry (CPI), the domain where HazOp originated. Also, they
were essentially rule-based expert systems and were not designed to facilitate the
reuse of experience [4]. Relatively few other automated tools for HazOp in other
domains have been reported in the literature [4]. This situation possibly reveals the
fact that the HazOp procedure in most cases is done manually but aided by the use
of spreadsheet software packages such as MS Excel and Lotus 1-2-3 in many
application domains.
It is only recently that case-based reasoning was introduced into HazOp and
few efforts have been reported so far. Sahar et al. in [6] presents a report on
development of a HazOp analysis management system with dynamic visual
model aid. The system is based entirely on CBR with no ontology support for
HazOp. In [7], a case-based expert system for automated HazOp analysis called
PHASUITE was developed. The PHASUITE system caters to the modification of
existing HazOp models and creation of new ones based on the knowledge in
existing models. It is also equipped with diagnostic reasoning capability and is
suitable mainly for process generic HazOp. It makes use of a suite of informally
specified ontologies. PHASUITE is specialised for application in the chemical
industry domain. The PetroHazOp [1] has specific application for the chemical
domain and was developed to cater to both process generic and non-process generic
HazOp. The system uses an integration of CBR and ontology for the automation of
both process generic and non-process generic HazOp procedures.
The PetroHazOp [1] and PHASUITE [7] systems are the ones most related to our
work since they are based on integration of CBR and ontology. However, none of
them have the capability for HazId based on requirements nor are they designed to
have any bearing or relevance to requirements engineering as conceived by our
approach. Additionally, unlike the two aforementioned tools that are specialised for
the chemical industry domain, our approach is a generic one that can be adapted to
support several types (process, software, human or procedure) of HazOp analysis in
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different application domains, given the existence a relevant domain ontology.
Hence, the novelty of our approach is the attempt to enable early identification of
systems hazards right from the requirements engineering phase of system develop-
ment and the reuse of experience in order to reduce the amount of resources needed
for HazOp. The core idea of this chapter has been reported in [27] in abridged form.
6.9 Conclusion
This work offers support for knowledge management in systems engineering at two
levels. Firstly, at the level of requirements, it facilitates the exploitation of knowl-
edge contained in requirements documentation for early identification of potential
system hazards. The novelty of this is the provision of tool-based support for safety
analysis at an earlier phase of system development as compared to previous efforts
that focus only on the design phase. Secondly, our approach facilitates the reuse
of experience in the conduct of HazOp so that previously documented HazOp
knowledge can be leveraged for reduced effort in new projects.
Specifically, we have provided a tool that can creditably assist, but not replace
the human expert in the conduct of HazOp analysis so as to attain reduction in effort
needed. Considering the fact that HazId is a highly creative process that depends on
the experience and skill of the human domain expert, the KROSA tool would be vital
as a good starting point. Also, from the results of the evaluation, KROSA has
demonstrated a good potential for application in an industrial context. The tool
would particularly be helpful in situations where highly skilled or experienced
HazOp experts are not available, by enabling a platform whereby previously
documented cases can be reused in new scenarios by a less-experienced HazOp team.
In further work, we intend to realise the objective of an extensive semantic
framework for safety analysis by extending the features of KROSA to support
FMEA. We will also investigate the prospects of providing diagnostic reasoning
over potential hazards in order to facilitate a more elaborate automated safety
analysis. In addition, we aim to conduct more extensive industrial case studies on
safety analysis of systems and product lines using the tool and to report our findings
subsequently.
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